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Society and Self: A Symbolic Interactionist
Framework for Sociological Practice
Janet Mancini Billson
The George Washington University
ABSTRACT
Interactionist concepts and explanations of human behavior preva-
lent among major psychological theory groups are traced in relation-
ship to the symbolic interactionist principles of emergence,
voluntarism, and process. I argue that most theory central to psychol-
ogy is interactionist in nature; that central tenets of symbolic
interactionism are woven throughout psychological theory; and that
the same interactionist premises can equally form the foundation for
clinical sociology as a form of sociological practice.
I saw sociology giving up by default a role in change efforts that necessitate
the consideration of social systems. Social workers, psychologists, political
scientists, gerontologists, criminologists, marriage and family counselors, to
name a few, have eagerly gone where we have failed to tread. Practitioners in
these fields, as social systems change agents, have carved a niche, often
protecting themselves with licensing laws and other restrictions that make entry
by sociologists difficult (Glass 1991, p.ix).
Since the late 1970s there has been a resurgence of clinical sociology, which
emerged initially in the 1920s (Wirth 1931; Lennard and Bernstein 1969;
Glassner and Freedman 1979; Bruhn and Rebach 1991), and an expansion of
applied sociology (Olsen and Micklin 1981; Freeman et al. 1983; T. Sullivan
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1992). Both clinical sociology and applied sociology qualify as variants of
sociological practice, although emphases on research, application, and interven-
tion fall variously along a continuum (Olsen 1987).1 We have engaged in healthy
debates within sociology as to the exact boundaries of practice—applied and
clinical. Such debate will no doubt continue to force us to confront the usefulness
of the sociological perspective in real world applications. However, we have
failed to convince other disciplines, clients, funding agencies, or the intervention
community that sociologists have a sound theoretical basis from which to
practice.
My purpose here is to unpack the essential contributions of symbolic
interactionist theory to practice, to show how interactionism and awareness of the
social context have permeated psychological practice, and to argue that interven-
tion grounded in interactionist theory has an integrity of its own. I explore some
of the similarities between theories that inform psychological/social work/
counseling interventions and the symbolic interactionism generally associated
with sociology. Some practitioners may draw more heavily from exchange,
conflict, functional, or other sociological perspectives—all of which are not only
useful but crucial to well-informed sociological practice. I will examine other
theoretical perspectives in a later article.
Sociological Invisibility
Reflecting what Glass (1991) calls "the invisibility of sociology," many
sociologists are reluctant to identify themselves as practitioners for fear of losing
status within the discipline or of being challenged from outside the discipline.
Many sociologists who apply sociological principles, methods, and perspectives
to facilitate change encounter resistance, confusion, and lack of legitimacy.
Practitioners in other fields and potential consumers/clients remain skeptical
toward those who present themselves as sociological practitioners. The sociologi-
cal establishment still overwhelmingly rewards scholarly-academic work rather
than practice. Relative invisibility and professional impotence have serious
implications for the ability of sociology to assert itself as a modern discipline in
touch with and able to influence the significant issues of our times. This
influences the professionalization of sociology and opportunities for consulting,
career innovation, and advancement.
Even though it would make logical sense for those who study society
(sociologists) to apply their knowledge toward the betterment of social health (as
psychologists apply their knowledge toward the betterment of individual mental
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health), enormous resistance against sociological practice emerged historically,
both within the discipline and among psychologists and social workers who
continue efforts to protect their professional turf.
Because of specialized training, historical accident, and systematic lobbying
of insurance companies and state legislators (who license practitioners), psy-
chologists, psychiatrists, social workers, counselors, and mental health workers
lead the list of those who may legitimately intervene when the fragile linkages
between self and society fray or when social organizations fail to operate
effectively. They, rather than sociologists, are asked to evaluate and recommend
changes in public policy and programs. Yet, sociological perspectives and
methods have infused the work of practitioners outside the discipline. The
underlying theoretical foundation of myriad therapeutic, counseling, interven-
tion, and applied research approaches is quintessentially sociological and
interactionist. Hybrid areas such as "political psychology" and "community
psychiatry" use symbolic interactionist as well as macro-sociotheoretical per-
spectives to explain race riots, police-community conflict, neighborhood deterio-
ration, gay-bashing, and so forth. Although much of this work is sociological, it
is seldom labeled as such. In applied fields such as marketing and opinion
research, social impact assessment, and program evaluation, those who have only
minimal exposure to sociological perspectives and methods frankly utilize them
without special training.
Although other professionals embrace the interactionist perspective as a
valid platform from which to practice, our contributions to interactionism have
not resulted in the same logic. Therein lies a central dilemma for sociology and
its practice. The dilemma exists because of the intimate nature of the connection
between the individual and the group. It remains because political boundaries and
definitions of turf drawn up decades ago are relatively inelastic and concretized
in social policy, licensing, and funding. It is problematic because psychological
theory is defined as providing an adequate base for practice and legitimate
application (with the insights of other disciplines providing icing on the cake), but
the reverse for sociology is not true. This situation contributes to a continuing
perception of sociology as non-utilitarian. Undergraduates see psychology or
social work as majors leading to a career path in practice; the same perception
does not generally hold for sociology as a major. The foundational force linking
sociological theory and research to practice is not as obvious to students, other
practitioners, the corporate world, or governments.
It is my task here to make this theoretical foundation more transparent and
to legitimize its use as a springboard for sociological practice. As Bruhn and
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Rebach (1991) argue, the crucial test of theory is its application. Recognizing and
legitimizing our theoretical underpinnings can empower the discipline as well as
individual sociological practitioners. I offer three major principles that help link
interactionism and practice: 1) the inseparability of society and self; 2) the
psycho-social matrix of interaction; and 3) the legitimacy of the interactionist
perspective as a basis for practice.
PRINCIPLE 1: The Inseparability of Society and Self
Regardless of disciplinary boundaries and professional turf wars, the compli-
cated interrelationships between society and self make it both theoretically and
practically impossible to separate them. The inseparability of society and self
severely limits fruitful study of the individual outside the context of social
interaction. C. Wright Mills, in his distinction between "personal troubles" and
"social issues," drew our attention to the inherent connections between the two
(1959). The school of sociology known as symbolic interactionism provides an
integrated theory of human behavior that recognizes the interplay between
individual and society. This perspective parallels and informs several interactionist
schools in psychology. Symbolic interactionists who focus specifically on the
articulation of personality systems and social systems have laid the groundwork
for an integrative perspective (for example, Mead 1934, 1956; Sanford 1966;
Shibutani 1961; Kaluger and Unkovic 1969; Spitzer 1969).
Textbooks persist in defining psychology as the study of the individual
psyche and the individual in society, and sociology as the study of society and
groups (and the individual in society). Psyche refers to the soul, mind, spirit, and
intelligence—located within individual human beings. Socius pertains to society
and social behavior—located in collections of human beings (families, groups,
communities, and organizations). The cross-fire debate over the relationship
between the individual (with all his or her unique qualities) and society (with its
capacity for blueprinting that uniqueness) confuses our attempts to understand
human behavior. Some disciplines, such as psychology and psychiatry, claim to
focus on the individual, relegating cultural and societal forces to a nebulous
"background." Other disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, have
focused on patterns of social organization, reserving a largely undefined and
strictly subordinate place for individual differences or intrapsychic processes.
Yet, it is existence with others that makes us human.
The attempt to separate individual from societal factors has been a thankless
and largely fruitless task—often done in the name of maintaining the "pure"
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perspective of one discipline or another. Yet, the attempt to find theoretically
viable links has proved equally elusive. Introductory sections of textbooks often
draw the lines between disciplines sharply, but in practice they become blurred
and can inhibit the creative study of human behavior. The trend of meshing
disciplines may be a reflection of this problem. We have witnessed the birth of
such fields as social anthropology, social psychiatry, political anthropology,
interpersonal psychiatry, community psychology, and of course, social psychol-
ogy. Although the latter represents an attempt to blend two perspectives, this
hybrid field also tends to bifurcate along the lines of a sociological and a
psychological branch—often manifested by departmental location of social
psychology courses.
Disciplinary lines become even more problematic when it comes to deciding
who is best equipped to help people cope with the daily exigencies of being
human, which almost always means being in groups. The attempt to draw clear
disciplinary lines in theory and research has been more illusion than reality.
Allegedly, psychologists do certain kinds of research, emphasizing the indi-
vidual, the internal, and the motivational—sociologists do other kinds of re-
search, emphasizing the social, the external, and the structural. In reality, the
paradigms and explanatory models of both disciplines have crossed over these
false boundaries.
Sociological ideas have informed—or run parallel to—much of the most
important theory generated by psychologists. The source of this phenomenon lies
in the nature of human beings. In order to understand and counsel with an
individual, even the best therapist must have some sense of the client's early
socialization, community, values, beliefs, role definitions, status, and aspirations.
Conversely, to understand and work effectively with a group, one must have some
notion of what makes specific individuals tick, and more broadly, of the basic
"psychological forces" lying behind any human behavior.
Because human beings are complex, it is sheer folly to argue that we can draw
clear disciplinary lines. Psychology emphasizes the intrapersonal, but in modern
practice a social context clearly frames that emphasis. Sociology emphasizes the
interpersonal, the group, the communal, and the societal, but recent forays into the
sociology of emotions suggest our need to probe more deeply into intrapsychic
phenomena. Regardless of discipline, we cannot isolate such problems as depres-
sion, addiction, family conflict, or homelessness as either individual or social
events. We don intellectual blinders when we argue that only those trained in one
perspective or the other can alleviate complex problems. Bauman, Stein, and
Ireys (1991) offer an alternative model that stresses neither discipline at the
expense of the other. They define an "effective intervention" as a "blend of theory,
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implementation, and context" that occurs at the intersection of discipline bound-
aries: "True innovation occurs at the place where different disciplines and world
views meet" (p. 249). We must discard old images and stereotypes if this
conception of theory and intervention is to prevail.
Unfortunately, the tendency to dichotomize in theory has spilled over into
assumptions about practice and has fostered psychology-based intervention and
inhibited sociology-based intervention. Sociologists have heard for several
decades that their concepts and theories have little or no direct relevance to
understanding individuals or even small groups. Although we may contribute
understanding, others have not defined this understanding as a springboard for
systematic efforts to change individuals, families, communities, or organizations.
Such efforts fall strictly into the province of clinical psychology or social work.
Yet, during the 1920s and 1930s sociologists served as respected and integral
activist-interventionist members of child guidance clinics and juvenile delin-
quency intervention teams. For an analysis of how this position eroded, see Fritz
(1989). Psychologists and social workers have staked out the territory of the
individual and—paradoxically—the couple, the family, even the community.
The National Association of Social Workers' definition of psychotherapy sug-
gests how broadly they define this territory:
Psychotherapy... is the use of psychosocial and social methods ...
to modify internal and external conditions that affect individuals,
families, groups, or communities with respect to their behavior,
emotions, and thinking, and their intrapersonal and interpersonal
processes. (Freedman 1982, p. 44)
Sociologists might contribute to understanding large-scale organizations or
societal level groupings, but resistance meets the idea that we carry the conceptual
tools to "modify internal and external conditions that affect individuals, families,
groups, or communities"; that is, to engage in intervention and change activities.
In the next section, I will show that even the most internal/intrapsychic
schools of psychological or psychoanalytical thought—which undergird coun-
seling, social work, counseling, and organizational development—make fre-
quent, indeed critical, forays out of the individual/affective realm into the realm
of social pressures and contexts. I will also argue that symbolic interactionism
constitutes a logical and fertile ground from which we can conduct sociologically
oriented practice.
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PRINCIPLE 2: The Psycho-Social Matrix of Interactionism
The psycho-social matrix of interactionism derives from the fact that even
psychological schools of thought have failed to explicate individual pathology
without reference to social interaction. This matrix permeates psychologically
oriented practice, but clearly parallels and derives influence from sociological
perspectives. Symbolic interactionists contend that both individual "human
nature and the social order are products of communication" (Shibutani 1961, p.
2). This contention provides a promising model for interdisciplinary
conceptualization and clinical practice. It rests on three symbolic interactionist
premises that throw into relief the interplay between the intrapersonal and the
interpersonal:
Emergence refers to the essential distinction between humans and all other
forms of life (Stryker 1959). That distinction, which lies primarily in our capacity
for speech and language, enables us to think, communicate, coordinate, and
interact with others as social animals. Language facilitates the unfolding of
culture and the process of socialization, allowing people "to understand one
another, to have behavioral expectations of one another, and consequently to
orient their own behavior to that of others" (Hall 1973, p. 37).
Process means that activity and change are the normal course of events for
humans, rather than equilibrium, stasis, or structure (Blumer 1962). This premise,
in opposition to the deterministic assumptions about human nature that charac-
terized early psychology, emanates from the writings of James (1892), Dewey
(1922), and Mead (1934). Process "characterizes all aspects of human behavior
including consciousness, thought, selfhood, activity, interaction, and society as
being dynamic and continuously in flux" (Hall 1973, p. 38). Process is central to
the symbolic interactionist view of group behavior as the product of "joint action"
created through negotiation between individuals.
Voluntarism means that people, as the basic units of analysis, are actors rather
than reactors. In Blumer's terminology, the interpretation of meaning for both
internal and external objects is "self-indication," a process through which a
person "notes, interprets, and assesses things with which he has to deal in order
to act" (1972, pp. 134–44). Through self-indication, the person is "creator" of his
or her own world, discovering as well as learning, inventing as well as responding.
The person is "not simply seen as a responder to or a vehicle for biological
impulses and/or social demands, but rather as the possessor of selfhood who
. . . creates objects, designates meanings, charts courses of action, interprets
situations, and controls his field" (Hall 1973).
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Symbolic interactionism, then, focuses on how humans handle and fashion
their world, including their interpersonal relationships. If we apply these three
central premises—emergence, process, and voluntarism—to the social symptom
of homelessness, for example, we see a logical basis for sociologically grounded
intervention: The individual creates through interaction with others a course of
action that yields a unique identity in flux. Intervention may disturb or redirect the
course of action and, thus, the person's identity. With these premises in view, let
us turn to a selective and retrospective discussion of some early and influential
20th-century psychological theories in order to demystify their explanatory
power.
Interactionism in Psychology and Psychiatry
A close relationship exists between symbolic interactionism and psychologi-
cal/psychoanalytic traditions. Although Sigmund Freud did not always make
social contexts explicit, external forces are omnipresent in his writing, especially
in Civilization and Its Discontents (1961 [1930]), Totem and Taboo (1950
[1913]), and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1975 [1921]). In
Group Psychology, Freud defines psychoanalysis as "social psychology" and
declares that individual psychology is rarely in a position to disregard the
relationship of the individual to others.
Even Freud's most intrapsychic of models relates the dynamics of self to the
social order. Values, ideals, and moral codes transmit through primary socializing
agents, manifested in the superego. His theory of the unconscious casts the id into
the role of seeking gratification through the "pleasure principle." A person tends
to seek pleasure and avoid pain according to definitions superimposed from birth
by parents and educators and later internalized as his or her superego (Freud
1955). The theory involves an important voluntaristic element, however, in that
id does not instinctively rule the personality, nor does superego arbitrarily restrict
it: ego seeks to reduce tension between id and superego through the "reality
principle."
Freud acknowledged the importance of significant others who, through
social interaction, assist ego in gradually dropping the id's elementary narcissism
and replacing it with the ability to love others and respect oneself (process and
emergence) (see Sanford 1963, p. 80). As Brown points out, Freud's belief that the
physico-chemical "interacted with an environment the most significant part of
which was other human beings" tempered his psychological determinism (1961,
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p. 11). The parallel concept in sociological symbolic interactionism is self-
concept, which develops through interpersonal relations (compare Cooley's
"looking glass self and Mead's I/me). Freud's model is strikingly similar to
Mead's description of the process whereby a child's "I" gradually incorporates
the values and attitudes of community ("the generalized other") into a more adult
and responsible "me" (Mead 1956). Mead's intertwined concepts of play, the
game, and the other lead us to a deeper understanding of how the unique
individual gradually comes to internalize social norms, develop shared meanings
with others in a team effort, and ultimately to take the role of the other.
Freud referred to psychoanalytic therapy as the "talking cure"—with a
decided emphasis on meaning and communication (emergence). It was also
voluntaristic in intent: The patient could achieve a "cure" by doing most of the
work. This method seems commonplace now, but in Freud's time it stood in stark
historical contrast to the typical treatments of prayer, isolation, medical remedies,
forcible restraint, and quackery. Significantly, Freud would not accept psychotics
as patients because they could not relate (communicate) to the analyst on the basis
of shared meanings.
Karen Horney also became known for her conviction that the patient could
take a large responsibility toward self-analysis, underscoring the voluntaristic
nature of her view of neurosis. Horney found the antecedents of disorder in social
situations, especially interpersonal relationships in the family, and viewed
neurosis as a disturbance in one's interpersonal orientation, including attitudes
toward others. She argued that neurosis is relative, varying in definition by
culture, class, and gender—a very sociological insight in itself: "Neurotic
responses are first of all deviations from the usual patterns of behavior appropriate
to a given culture at a given point in time. They are both culturally determined and
culturally relative" (Ford and Urban 1965, p. 493). Her scheme clearly encom-
passes interactionist concerns with shared meaning, as well as with voluntarism.
The ego-analysts, who also extended and diverged from Freud's ideas (for
example, Erikson 1968), emphasized normality, health, and day-to-day experi-
ences as crucial to understanding the person. They offered a constructive,
voluntaristic interpretation of human motivations that defined people as actively
seeking interaction with situational events in their "social milieu." The person not
only reacts to, but seeks engagement with the social and physical world; the
interactionist position on voluntarism and negotiation of identities and joint
actions parallels this analysis. Each person develops adaptations that are useful
in handling the social and situational environment.
Alfred Adler, who made an open and relatively clean break from orthodox
Freudian analytical theory, represents a further move toward an interactionist
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position. Adler acknowledged the impact of events and relationships external to
the individual, but insisted that "objective reality" is observable to therapist or
researcher only through the subjective report or "fictions" of the individual .Adler
recommended that the therapist use "empathic understanding"—trying to see
actor from actor's point of view (1931, p. 72). This is similar to "subjective
interpretation" (Weber) which, as Alfred Schutz points out, is an attempt to
understand "the actor's action from his, the actor's point of view" (1963, p. 245).
Adler felt that how a person interprets and evaluates experience is more important
than the experience per se. A social context of "interlocking" relations embeds
the individual from birth onward. This is clearly in keeping with the interactionist
insistence on respecting the real world of the person and on interpreting reality
only through the eyes of the observed. It is also reminiscent of Cooley's notion
of "definition of the situation."
According to Adler, each person develops his or her own "style of life," fixed
by age five, and relatively unchanging over the person's lifetime. Adler believed
that no one can live effectively in isolation from others; individual psychology
became very much a social psychology. The person's responses to interpersonal
situations were paramount. One of the basic responses of a normal person, said
Adler, was social interest, the absence of which would indicate pathology.
Finally, in enumerating "safeguarding tendencies" that protect an individual's
evaluation of self as superior, Adler included two major orientations toward
others—aggression and seeking distance. In his theory of the inferiority complex,
he carried his stress on meaning and definition to a conclusion paralleled by the
sociological concept of relative deprivation.
Third Force or humanistic psychology (exemplified by the work of Rogers
1961, 1963) distinctly concerns itself not only with the inner workings of an
individual's psyche, but also with the symbolic meanings attached to inner
images, and to one's capacity to relate effectively with others. Like Adler a
phenomenologist and a firm believer in the goal-directed capacities of humans,
Carl Rogers views the individual as a purposive organism capable of "free and
undistorted awareness." His theory is clearly interactionist and voluntaristic.
Rogers assumes that individuals are inherently capable of differentiating between
effective and desirable, and ineffective and undesirable responses: ". .. experi-
ences are being accurately symbolized and continually and freshly valued in
terms of the satisfactions organismically experienced" (Rogers 1963, p. 210).
This passage is reminiscent of Blumer's self-indication and interpretation of
meanings. The cue to differentiation for Rogers is the full range of affective
responses that permit the person to evaluate each experience or interaction and
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eventually to form purposive behavior (Blumer's "line of action"). Events
become symbolized through images and language ("self-experience"), which in
turn feed into the "concept of self"—patterns of thought about the self and about
the relationship of self to others. In growing up, the child experiences parental
anger or disapproval as a negative affect, love and approval as a positive
experience. He or she develops a "need for positive regard," which also stems
from evaluations by others that have direct consequences for the child's interper-
sonal relationships. Behavior disorder results from conflicting or negative mes-
sages from the crucially important others who thus produce in the person a
negative self-evaluation (and pathology).
Existential psychology takes the themes of phenomenology (subjective
experience of the individual) and the importance of social interaction to perhaps
their logical conclusion: We simply cannot understand the individual outside
the context of his or her social environment. Neither psychological nor
sociological (nor any) theories of behavior are totally accurate because they do
damage to the inner, personal character of a person's immediate experience by
fragmenting it (a view that is central to symbolic interactionism). The person
always exists within a context, and derives a sense of being through relations with
other people, objects, and situations. "Authentic being" consists of sharing one's
subjective world with that of others, and vice versa. Illness consists of "nonbeing"
or "nothingness" and a sense of isolation from others. A person's behavior is the
product of self awareness and "habitual ways and intents of relating with and to
situations, objects, and people" (Ford and Urban 1965, p. 449; compare May 1958,
pp. 61-66).
The work of Harry Stack Sullivan (1953) is fundamentally an interactionist
statement. Sullivan refuses to conceive of the individual in vacuo. People make
other people sick; people are necessary to make them well again. Interpersonal
transactions both produce and alleviate emotional disorders; his emphasis is not
on individual behavior so much as on "interpersonal transactions." Like Freud,
Sullivan defines the therapeutic relationship in terms of interactions between
client and therapist, referring to the latter as a participant observer (a term
prominent in sociological methodology, of course).
Sullivan speaks of "dynamisms"—learned, habitual patterns of response
surrounding human interaction—and of the "self-system" of behaviors acquired
in interpersonal relationships that serve to avoid or minimize anxiety. These
behaviors become patterned or systematized for each individual. The self-system,
which eventually comes to protect the person's self-esteem, Sullivan feels is a
pattern universally found in normal as well as disordered individuals. The
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person's "orientation to living," he says, is a critical development during the
"juvenile era—the actual time for becoming social" (1953, p. 227). Intimacy and
loneliness characterize pre-adolescence. During early adolescence the develop-
ment of sexual interest in the opposite sex is an important shift in interaction
patterns. Similarly, Sullivan defines personality as the "relatively enduring
pattern of recurring interpersonal relationships characteristic of the human life"
(1953, pp. 110-11).
Learning theory and behavioral psychology, with their currently fashionable
application as behavior modification, deal with the impact on the individual of
rewards and punishments that emanate from external sources, usually human.
Behaviorism deals with interaction between self and other in a predominantly
mechanistic (action-reaction) model, rather than in voluntaristic terms.
We have seen how psychological theory views internal pressures as emanat-
ing from the biological nature of humans, but also from a person's relationship to
others. Both the internally produced (drives, instincts, physical needs) and the
externally produced (needs for intimacy, security, status, approval) are salient
features of human behavior. Furthermore, we can see from this cursory examina-
tion the recurrent suggestion that humans appear to develop patterns of interac-
tion with others that are internally as well as interpersonally meaningful. These
patterns carry explanatory power greater than that achieved by intrapsychic or
physiological phenomena alone. Interactionist assumptions and ideas infuse the
framework for psychologically grounded practice. They also provide a basis for
sociologically grounded practice.
PRINCIPLE 3: Legitimacy of the Interactive Perspective
as a Basis for Practice
The third principle underscores the legitimacy of the interactive perspective
as a foundation for sociological practice. As we have seen, interactionist threads
in psychology point to the futility of trying to separate individual from societal
forces in explaining human behavior. However, sociological models of interac-
tion have tended to overemphasize socialization and internalization of social
norms, at the expense of incorporating personality and other differences into
social theories (Ellis 1971, pp. 692-703; Wrong 1964, pp. 112-22).
Historically, psychological theorists recognized the social context of human
pathology and health, but their direction of treatment emphasized the individual
end of the individual-social dimension. Although the symbolic interactionist
principles of emergence, process, and voluntarism figure prominently in their
works (albeit not labeled as such), narrowly individualistic therapies emphasiz-
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ing intrapsychic dynamics were adopted by behaviorists, social workers, and
psychotherapists. The most significant exception is family systems therapy,
which emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s and focused on interaction patterns
among family members. For example, Watzlawick (1990) rejects the traditional
psychodynamic approach of seeking causal explanations of personal disorder in
traumatic childhood events. He emphasizes uncovering patterns of interaction,
conflicting definitions of the situation, and lack of shared perceptions. Therapy
is an activity that helps clients develop harmonious constructions of reality. This
is certainly a contemporary version of symbolic interactionism.
Equally, sociological practitioners place individual problems and symptoms
firmly within a social and interactive context. We offer a broad interactionist
understanding that contributes to breakthroughs in the treatment of individuals,
small groups, or families. We work on organizational or community issues by
carefully applying research findings, theories, and concepts to a level of social
order that we still understand as a product of individual interactions. Both micro-
and macro-level interventions become more powerful when we resist psycholo-
gizing or treating the unit of analysis in vacuo.
The Challenge to Sociological Practice
The challenge to sociological practice is to ferret out the best of sociological
theory—from whatever perspective—and systematically show how we can
translate our insights and predictions into application in the real world of
individuals, families, gangs, corporations, groups, and communities. Rebach
suggests that sociological intervention
. . . helps client systems change networks, add roles, strengthen
relationships, deal with interactional difficulty and with socially
constructed reality ... intervention plans include establishing struc-
tures that prevent regression and facilitate continued adaptation and
change as needed by the social system. (1991, p. 63)
For example, role theory provides a vital connecting link between the
structural level of society (the nomothetic) and the personal level (the idio-
graphic); it is one rich source of insights. Levinson specifies the "personal role-
definition" (variation in style of performance of roles) as a phenomenon that
represents the integration of the psyche and the socius. As such, personal role
definition is an aspect of personality and represents the individual's attempt to
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structure social reality (1964, p. 292). Fein (1990, 1991) sees personal unhappi-
ness as problems in roles: Fix badly constructed or dysfunctional roles and help
people change them through social support, socialization, and resocialization.
The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R)-1987 defines personality traits and personality
disorders:
Personality traits are enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and
thinking about the environment and oneself, exhibited in a wide range
of social and personal contexts. It is only when personality traits are
inflexible and maladaptive and cause either significant impairment in
social or occupational functioning or subjective stress that they
constitute Personality Disorders.
Fein makes the point that roles created through interaction may be faulty and
result in interpersonal disturbances. The DSM mentions but does not fully explore
the interpersonal and social context of roles.
Sociologically speaking, two or more persons in focused interaction consti-
tute a group. Concepts such as definition of the situation, self-fulfilling prophecy,
and marginality also furnish intelligible links between individual and society.
They go a long way in helping us to fathom the underlying causes of conflicts for
and among individuals in families, work groups, communities, and bureaucra-
cies. It is appropriate to return to the NASW definition of psychotherapy referred
to earlier: "[Psychotherapy is] ... the use of psychosocial and social methods
... to modify internal and external conditions that affect individuals, families,
groups, or communities with respect to their behaviors, emotions, and thinking,
and their intrapersonal and interpersonal processes." Practice for sociologists lies
in intervention in problems relating to interpersonal processes as they appear in
patterned interaction among individuals in groups of all sizes and types. The
primary goal of such intervention is to modify interpersonal behavior and to
ameliorate the negative impacts of external conditions that affect interpersonal
processes.
What are "psychosocial and social methods"? Are they beyond the realm of
sociological practice? Are they limited to Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian, Ericksonian,
or other "psychological" therapies? Or can sociologists engage in intervention for
positive social change with methods derived from our own perspective? Although
sociologists may often utilize practice skills and techniques developed by social
workers and psychologists, we have developed many of our own. For example,
community analysis and organization (Alinsky 1941), the focused interview
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(Merton, Fisk, and Kendall 1956), social analysis (Jaques 1982), and participa-
tory research (Stoecker and Beckwith 1992), just to name a few, were crafted from
the breadth and scope of the sociological perspective. In turn, we have influenced
techniques used by other disciplines.
Seem (1991) says there are skills most closely identified with applied
sociology (e.g, applied research, theory construction, and curriculum design) and
skills most closely identified with clinical sociology (e.g., counseling, problem
solving, and practical teaching). While this division within sociological practice
is irrefutable, there are nonetheless central sociological practice skills such as
"community organization (mobilizing), planning, problem solving, qualitative
and quantitative research, applied research, statistics, program administration,
leadership, program evaluation, marketing, public speaking, clinical intervention
in social, political, and psychological systems, small group communication skills,
political analysis and coalition building, self-clarification, ethical decision mak-
ing, consultation, mediation, applied demography, theory construction (induc-
tive and deductive), theoretical application and intervention, interviewing, coun-
seling, brokering, formal writing, grant writing, critical thinking, empathy, and
networking..." (pp. 64-67). Bruhn and Rebach (1991) list roles sociologists can
play: Organizational consultant/organizational development; social impact as-
sessment; community organization; mediation/conflict resolution; program de-
velopment/program evaluation; counselor/sociotherapy; teacher/trainer; bro-
ker; advocate; and group facilitator.
Can sociotherapy, facilitated group interaction, community action, network
analysis, organizational analysis, social impact assessment, program evaluation
and development, and conflict resolution—just to mention a few methods utilized
by sociologists—constitute an equally legitimate practice? Logically, there is no
reason why they cannot. For example, Wenner (1991) discusses his role as a
sociologist in the Department of Agriculture as "identifying measures to avoid or
reduce unwanted social and economic effects of agency programs" and "design-
ing and initiating a training program in social impact analysis" (p. 4). The specific
skills or techniques used in sociological intervention draw from a variety of
helping and action frameworks and are still being expanded. The important
distinction for clinical sociology is that it constitutes the "application of a variety
of critically applied practices which attempt sociological diagnosis and treatment
of groups and group members in communities" (Glassner and Freedman 1979, p.
5).
The meaning attached to interaction by all participants is a key both to
intrapersonal motivational impetus and consequences for group members. Mean-
ing should form a touchstone to which the clinical sociologist will return again
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and again in working with clients. The regularized, typical patterns of group
structure, norms, and stages of development—theoretical and empirical explora-
tion of which is a rich part of the sociological tradition—can provide a platform
from which the sociologist analyzes and interprets interpersonal conflict, power
and leadership struggles, isolation and alienation of individuals within sub-
groups, and role problems. Finally, we should cast in a new interventional light
the vast sociological literature on cultural and ethnic differences (and their impact
on individual behavior), socialization (and its failures), and the formation of
identity, the self, and self-concept.
The act of applying sociology involves commitment and passion, risk and
excitement. Monti, in his recounting of Frederick Thrasher's important early
work on gangs in Chicago, underscores the "sense of urgency that drove Thrasher
to ask not just interesting questions, but important questions.... It is only by doing
something with our work, and not merely doing the work itself, that we are likely
to learn what is important and what is not" (p. 38). In his re-interpretation of
Weber's "Science as a Vocation," Lechner writes in "Sociology as a Vocation"
that "we can find meaning in sociology as a profession and a passion, as a virtue
and a vocation. To argue that we can is not to imply that we always do; just as
Weber did not claim that all scholarship was in fact illuminating...."(p. 47).
Olsen (1987, p. 3) defined applied sociology as "the processes of applying
sociological knowledge and techniques to understanding and dealing with
social issues and problems." Because the process of applying sociology "brings
scholarship and practice together into a more integrated endeavor in which
both kinds of sociological work are highly interrelated and interdependent,"
it unifies sociology into a single profession (p. 5). Olsen's definitions exclude
clinical practice and define activities such as social impact assessment and
program evaluation as applied rather than clinical sociology.
The purpose of the best sociology is to understand people as people, not as
isolated psyches tangled in their internal webs, nor as social beings caught in the
morass of their cultures. As sociology matures, it must meet the challenge of
showing how sociological theory is not only relevant to, but essential for the most
effective intervention in the lives of real people. That other disciplines have relied
on interactionist interpretations of human behavior should be a lesson to sociolo-
gists as well. The strength of sociology is that we also have developed broad social
structural theories that enable us to approach problems of human interaction
through multiple levels of analysis. Indeed, we have a rich and legitimate
theoretical source for sociological practice and application.
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NOTES
This paper has benefited greatly from suggestions made by sociological practitioners C. Margaret
Hall, Jonathan Freedman, Jan Fritz, Patricia See, Cordell Thomas, and anonymous reviewers.
1. In a survey of over 700 sociological practitioners, Ruggiero and Weston (1991, p. 62) found
seven principal objectives that define practice: "social problem solving, research problem solving,
social change, client-centered work/research, intervention, problem analysis/exploration, [and]
person problem solving." Clark (1986, p.l) defines clinical sociology as "the application of a
sociological perspective to the analysis and design of intervention for positive social change at any
level of social organization."
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